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Abstract
Individuals with Williams syndrome (WS) show a specific deficit in visuo-spatial abilities. This finding, however, derives mainly
from performance on small-scale laboratory-based tasks. This study investigated large-scale route learning in individuals with
WS and two matched control groups (moderate learning difficulty group [MLD], typically developing group [TD]). In a non-
labelling and a labelling (verbal information provided along the route) condition, participants were guided along one of two
unfamiliar 1-km routes with 20 junctions, and then retraced the route themselves (two trials). The WS participants performed
less well than the other groups, but given verbal information and repeated experience they learnt nearly all of the turns along the
route. The extent of improvement in route knowledge (correct turns) in WS was comparable to that of the control groups.
Relational knowledge (correctly identifying spatial relationships between landmarks), compared with the TD group, remained
poor for both the WS and the MLD group. Assessment of the relationship between performance on the large-scale route-learning
task and that on three small-scale tasks (maze learning, perspective taking, map use) showed no relationship for the TD
controls, and only a few non-specific associations in the MLD and WS groups.
Introduction
Williams syndrome (WS) is a genetic disorder, occurring
in 1 in 20,000 births (Morris & Mervis, 1999). People
with WS have an IQ of approximately 60 (Udwin & Yule,
1990), which usually comprises higher verbal than visuo-
spatial abilities (e.g. Bellugi, Wang & Jernigan, 1994;
Grant et al., 1997).
We investigated the visuo-spatial abilities of people
with WS by asking them to learn a 1-km route through a
university campus. Learning a route involves visuo-
spatial abilities, including perspective taking, encoding
relationships between landmarks, and the sequence of
turns along a route, and is part of developing an overall
cognitive representation of an area (Siegel & White,
1975). We will refer to the route-learning task as a ‘large-
scale’ spatial task, because it took place in a real
environment. There has not been any previous research
into the development of large-scale knowledge in WS,
and prior to the present research nothing was known
about how people with WS learn an unfamiliar
landscape. Before we began the research we collected
anecdotal reports from parents ⁄guardians of people with
WS. This revealed a common belief that people with WS
often get lost or disorientated in unfamiliar places. If this
is the case, we expected people with WS to be less
efficient (than typically developing [TD] people) in
learning new environments. In support of this, fMRI
and MRI investigation has shown atypical hippocampal
metabolism in WS (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2005), an
area implicated in large-scale route learning. This
research has implications for spatial theories (discussed
below). It also has practical implications, because
identifying the type of deficits experienced by people
with WS in large-scale tasks could lead to remedial
interventions designed to improve wayfinding abilities.
In contrast to the case for large-scale tasks there are
many ‘small-scale’ tests of spatial ability (Freundshuh,
2000). Such tasks are carried out in small spaces (e.g. in a
laboratory, in a model layout, on a table top). Previous
research with participants with WS has focused on their
ability to perform small-scale spatial tasks (e.g. Landau
& Hoffman, 2007). The research with small-scale tasks
has shown that, despite an overall impaired level of
ability, WS participants have relative strengths and
weaknesses in the spatial domain (Farran & Jarrold,
2003). Neuro-anatomically, it was hypothesized that this
reflects impaired dorsal stream functions (object
localization, perception for action) relative to ventral
stream functions (object and face recognition) (Atkinson
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et al., 1997). More recently, empirical evidence has
pointed towards a further fractionation within the
dorsal stream, as some dorsal functions are more
impaired than others (Atkinson et al., 2006; Farran &
Jarrold, 2004; Jordan, Reiss, Hoffman & Landau, 2002).
In support of this, Meyer-Lindenberg et al. (2004)
showed reduced dorsal stream activation for location
coding in WS, relative to control participants. They relate
this to a reduction in grey matter at the dorsal
occipitoparietal sulcus ⁄vertical part of the intraparietal
sulcus, but emphasize that this would not impact all
dorsal functions.
Given the deficit within the visuo-spatial domain,
albeit measured by small-scale tasks, coupled with
cortical evidence, this suggests that large-scale route-
learning performance, as part of the visuo-spatial
domain, should also be impaired. We were also
interested in whether performance on small-scale tasks
holds any predictive value for performance on large-scale
tasks. Below, we give examples of how impaired spatial
abilities in WS might be detrimental to the learning of
large spaces. These examples emphasize the importance
of testing empirically whether one can assume a
commonality between the spatial abilities required for a
small-scale versus a large-scale task, and whether small-
scale task performance extrapolates to large-scale
abilities. Until now, this had not been assessed in WS,
and the validity of such an assumption was unknown.
Performance on construction and drawing tasks
represents a relative weakness in WS, compared to
performance on purely perceptual tasks (Farran &
Jarrold, 2001). The pattern of performance on
construction and drawing tasks shows a lack of global
organization, withmore attention given to the details than
to the cohesive image (i.e. a local bias). If one were to
assume that this related to large-scale ability, such a bias
might be detrimental when people with WS need to
develop knowledge of a large area, because such
knowledge depends on organizing partial perceptual
views of an environment into a coherent cognitive
representation of the whole area (Kitchin & Blades, 2002).
Nardini, Atkinson, Braddick and Burgess (2008)
reported a poor ability to use landmarks to find a
target in a small-scale spatial array. This was more
pronounced when participants had to rely on the spatial
configuration of the array (intrinsic frame of reference)
than it was when they could determine location relative
to the position of their body (body frame of reference). If
poor use of landmarks in a small-scale task relates to
large-scale environments, this suggests that individuals
with WS might find it difficult both to learn a sequence
of turns and to encode the spatial relationship between
landmarks, with greater impairment on the latter. Such
deficits would seriously impair their cognitive
representation of the environment.
However, the deficits in small-scale spatial abilities in
WS do not necessarily mean that this group has deficits
in large-scale spatial tasks. There is much evidence to
suggest that spatial ability is not a single construct, but is
composed of numerous mechanisms (Allen, Kirasic,
Dobson, Long & Beck, 1996). Despite this, there is
little agreement as to what these independent constructs
are (Quaiser-Pohl, Lehmaan & Eid, 2004). Hegarty &
Waller (2005) reviewed most investigations of the
relationship between spatial abilities at different scales
and found that there was little or no relationship between
performance on small-scale and large-scale tasks for TD
adults. This has also been shown for TD children
(Quaiser-Pohl et al., 2002). This suggests that these two
types of task rely on different spatial mechanisms, and
thus this distinction might also apply to WS.
To our knowledge, there are no comparisons of brain
activation in the performance of small-scale versus large-
scale spatial tasks. However, dorsal stream activation
features strongly in reports of small-scale task
performance (e.g. Han, Song, Ding, Yund & Woods,
2001), whereas the hippocampus shows key activation in
large-scale tasks (e.g. Hartley, Maguire, Spiers & Burgess,
2003). The hippocampus receives input from the dorsal
stream, and thus, although they are not fully
independent, it appears that large-scale spatial abilities
implicate distinct cortical areas, relative to small-scale
spatial abilities. In relation to WS, both dorsal and
hippocampal activation are atypical (Meyer-Lindenberg
et al., 2004; 2005).
Like other researchers, Allen et al. (1996) did not find
any direct relationship between a set of small-scale
psychometric tests and large-scale spatial performance
(learning a route through a city) with TD adults, but
they did find an indirect relationship. They found that
two types of small-scale spatial tasks (maze learning,
perspective taking) were related both to the psychometric
measures and to large-scale environmental learning.
Maze learning was related to route-learning measures,
and perspective taking was related to measures of
relational knowledge.
Given Allen et al.’s (1996) findings, we included
measures of maze learning and perspective taking in
our study. The maze task was designed for young
children (Gathercole & Pickering, 2000) and so was
simpler than, but similar to, the one used by Allen et al.
(1996). Pilot work with a group of people with WS (who
did not take part in the present experiment) indicated
that a perspective-taking task like the one used by Allen
et al. (1996) for TD adults was too difficult for WS
participants. We therefore used a perspective-taking
task designed for young TD children (Massangkay
et al., 1974). Given the relationship found by Allen
et al. (1996) between small-scale (maze learning,
perspective taking) and large-scale (route walking)
learning, we expected the same relationship to apply to
the performance of participants in our study.
We also considered how the ability to learn a route
might be improved in WS, using two facilitation
techniques. The first was a verbal labelling strategy. In
one condition, participants were given verbal
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information about the route while they experienced it for
the first time. We know that verbal cognition is a relative
strength in WS, so we thought that this relative strength
might be used to scaffold performance in relatively
weaker areas of cognition. Farran, Jarrold and
Gathercole (1999) investigated WS performance on the
Performance subtests of the Weschler Intelligence Scale
for Children III (WISC III; Weschler, 1992). They
demonstrated that the WISC III subtests that shared
variance that was uniquely associated with performance
on the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (Dunn, Dunn,
Whetton & Pintilie, 1982), a verbal measure, represented
higher levels of visuo-spatial performance. In contrast,
the subtests that shared variance that was uniquely
associated with performance on Raven’s Coloured
Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1993), a measure of non-
verbal ability, represented lower levels of visuo-spatial
ability. This demonstrated that, in WS, when a non-verbal
task allows an increased input from verbal cognition, this
is a beneficial strategy to elevate performance.
The above interaction between verbal and non-verbal
ability appears to be bi-directional: some aspects of
spatial language are relatively impaired within the verbal
domain in WS (Laing & Jarrold, 2007; Landau &
Hoffman, 2005; Lukcs, Plh & Racsmny, 2007; Phillips
et al., 2004). Laing & Jarrold (2007) demonstrated that
when spatial comparisons relied on spatial models
(whether the blue or red animal is physically bigger on
the page) participants with WS showed a significant
deficit, relative to when comparisons relied on semantic
knowledge (whether a bear or snail is bigger). Lukcs
et al. (2007) showed a similar differentiation between
performance on spatial language tasks that activate
spatial models and that on those that do not require
on-line spatial analysis. In our labelling condition, the
information about the route involved pointing out
objects along the route within their spatial context
using spatial terms such as ‘next to’ and ‘passed’. As
individuals with WS can understand the semantics of
such terms, we anticipated that any facilitation in the WS
group would not be inhibited by the use of spatial
language.
Farran et al. (1999) did not explicitly encourage verbal
strategies for task completion, and therefore people with
WS may use such strategies spontaneously. In the present
study, it is therefore possible that introducing a verbal
strategy for route learning might not have a facilitatory
effect on performance in the WS group, as they may
already be using a verbal strategy. Any improvement in
performance was therefore considered in comparison to
a group of individuals with moderate learning difficulties
(MLD) and a group of TD individuals. We predicted that
the relative magnitude of any facilitatory effect of
explicitly encouraging a verbal strategy when learning
the route would determine the extent to which each
group spontaneously uses verbal strategies. That is, if
verbal strategies are already in place, little or no
facilitation should be evident, but if verbal strategies
are not spontaneously used, facilitation effects should be
observed.
The second facilitation technique was the use of
repetition. We asked participants to re-trace the route
twice; that is, after experiencing the route and retracing it
once, they were asked to retrace it a second time.
Repeated experience of routes by TD individuals usually
results in rapid learning (Kitchin & Blades, 2001) and
therefore we expected the TD controls to be at or near
ceiling on retrace 2. If the participants with WS also
benefited from repeated experience we expected them to
perform better on retrace 2 than on retrace 1.
However, route recall depends on long-term memory,
which is poor in WS. This has been shown for both
verbal and visuo-spatial long-term memory tasks,
although the relative performance on verbal and visuo-
spatial tasks shows mixed patterns of ability (Vicari,
Brizzolara, Carlesimo, Pezzini & Volterra, 1996; Jarrold
et al., 2007; Brock, Brown & Boucher, 2006). Vicari et al.
(1996) showed a relative deficit in a visuo-spatial memory
task (Rey Figures) compared to a verbal memory task
(word-list learning). In contrast, Jarrold et al. (2007)
found similarly poor visual and verbal memory, using the
doors and people task (Baddeley, Emslie & Nimmo-
Smith, 1994). As route learning is a long-term memory
task, we predicted that the performance of the WS
participants would be poorer than the performance of
the TD controls, but that immediate repetition might be
a useful strategy for improving their large-scale route
learning.
We also included a spatial representation task based
on Blades & Cooke (1994): participants used a map of a
room to find a target location in the room. We wanted to
find out if participants with WS could apply information
gained from a small-scale representation (the map) to the
large space (the room) that it represented. We reasoned
that, if participants with WS demonstrated an ability to
use representations, map using might be another way to
facilitate environmental learning in WS.
In summary, the present study investigated large-scale
spatial knowledge in WS, an issue that has not been
investigated before. Both stages of large-scale spatial
knowledge development (route learning, relational
knowledge) were measured. Control groups of TD and
MLD participants were included. We note that, although
there have been many studies of real-world spatial
development in the typical population, MLD
participants have not been studied in large real
environments before. We considered the effects of
providing participants with verbal information about
the route while they were learning it, and also the effects
of practice on those participants who retraced the route
more than once. We also assessed participants’
performance on two small-scale tasks, which, based on
previous findings (Allen et al., 1996), we expected to
correlate with performance on the large-scale task.
Finally, we included a map task to determine whether
participants could transfer information learnt from
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small-scale representation to a real room. We have made
some predictions, based on our assumptions about how
the abilities and limitations of people with WS might
apply in a large-scale learning task.
Method
Participants
Twenty participants with WS were recruited through the
Williams Syndrome Foundation, UK. All participants
had received a positive diagnosis of WS based on
phenotypic and genetic information. Genetic diagnosis
was based on a fluorescent in situ hybridization
(FISH) test. The FISH test identifies the deletion of
elastin on the long arm of chromosome 7, which occurs
in approximately 95% of individuals with WS (Lenhoff,
Wang, Greenberg & Bellugi, 1997).
Two control groups were included: a group of
participants with non-specific moderate learning
difficulties (MLD) and a group of typically developing
(TD) participants. Full Scale IQ (FSIQ) was determined
using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence
(WASI; Wechsler, 1999). The WASI consists of four subtests:
block design and matrix reasoning as Performance
measures; and vocabulary and similarities as Verbal
measures. The FSIQs of the WS and MLD participants
were calculated from their performance on all four
subtests. The FSIQs of the TD participants were
calculated from their performance on the vocabulary
and matrix reasoning subtests.
Each participant with WS was individually matched to
a participant with MLD and to a TD participant. WS
and MLD participants were matched on the basis of
chronological age (CA) and Performance IQ. WS and
TD participants were matched by CA. Participant details
are shown in Table 1.
In Table 1, the WS group do not appear to show the
characteristic discrepancy of higher Verbal IQ than
Performance IQ. This is due to two related factors.
First, this discrepancy typically emerges with
development (Jarrold, Baddeley & Hewes, 1998a) and
the participants included here had not reached the end
stage of development (14 of the WS group were under
18 years). Second, many of the WS group scored at floor
on one or more of the four WASI subtests, which could
mask any VIQ–PIQ discrepancies (an effect also
observed by Arnold et al., 1985; Udwin et al., 1986;
Pagon et al., 1987). To explore this, we calculated the
VIQ–PIQ discrepancy in the six individuals with WS
who did not show floor effects on either of the two VIQ
subtests (three of these WS participants showed floor
effects on one of the PIQ subtests, however, thus
potentially still constraining any discrepancy). The
VIQ–PIQ discrepancies for these individuals were: 14,
–11, 15, 1, 16 and 11, respectively. Thus, those who had
reached a later stage of development, and were not
affected by floor effects, overall showed the VIQ–PIQ
discrepancy characteristic of WS.
Design and procedure
Route walking
Participants were guided by an experimenter along two
different routes (A and B) on the campus of Reading
University. None of the participants had had any previous
experience of either of the routes. Each route was 1 km
long and each included 20 ‘choice points’. A choice point
was a junction along the route where participants had to
decide whether to turn left, turn right, or walk straight
ahead. Each of the routes also included four landmarks
thatwere unique places along the route (e.g. red door, large
green bin, bench). One landmark was at the start of each
route, and the other three landmarks were distributed
along the route. Each route was along paths between large
university buildings so that participants had only limited
views ahead. There were no unique, salient landmarks
such as high buildings or other features that could have
served as distant landmarks (although we cannot rule out
the sun being used as a directional landmark), and we
tested participants during the summer when trees and
bushes were all in full leaf and thus further limited views
across the campus.
A script was used by the experimenter while leading the
participant along each route. To make the task as clear as
possible, participants were told to think of the
experimenter as a bus driver who was taking them along
the route and that later it would be their turn to drive the
bus (i.e. lead theway) from the start to the end of the route.
As participantswalked each route the four landmarkswere
pointed out by name (e.g. red door). The landmarks were
described as ‘bus stops’, and participants were told to
remember where the bus stopswere so that they could stop
the bus when it was their turn to be the driver.
Table 1 Participant details
Group
CA (years; months) Mean (SD)
Mean (SD) Range PIQ VIQ FSIQ
WS (n = 20) 15;04 (5;02) 8;06–25;01 62.30 (9.47) 62.20 (9.20) 59.30 (8.82)
MLD (n = 20) 14;11 (5;05) 7;09–26;03 63.25 (6.84) 63.90 (11.41) 60.80 (8.95)
TD (n = 20) 15:03 (4;09) 8;08–24;00 114.25 (16.80)
CA, chronological age; PIQ, Performance IQ; VIQ, Verbal IQ; FSIQ, Full Scale IQ; WS, Williams syndrome; MLD, moderate learning difficulty; TD, typically developing.
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There were two conditions. In the non-labelling
condition, the remainder of the script was not
descriptive of the route, and as the participants were
guided along the route they were given only non-specific
instructions like ‘this way now’. In the labelling
condition, participants were given instructions that
included directional information and information about
features along the route (e.g. ‘… down this little path and
past the fish pond’).
After a participant had been guided around the route
once by the experimenter, s ⁄he was asked to take a turn
as the ‘bus driver’, and retrace the route leading the
experimenter. Participants’ turns at each choice point
were noted, and the number of correct turns (maximum:
20) was used as a measure of route knowledge. If a
participant made an incorrect turn at a choice point this
was recorded as incorrect, and the experimenter led them
back to the junction and asked them to make another
choice. Only participants’ first choice of turn at each
junction was scored.
When retracing the route, participants were asked to
stop at each of the four landmarks (‘bus stops’), from
where they were asked to point to the other three
landmarks (a total of 12 pointing choices while retracing
a route). The four landmarks were never directly visible
from each other. A participant indicated the position of a
landmark by using a ‘camera-gun’, which recorded the
pointing direction as a still photograph. The participant
pointed the camera-gun in what they thought was the
correct direction of the target landmark, and the
experimenter took a photograph using a remote switch.
The photographs were used to calculate the difference (in
degrees) between a participant’s pointing estimate and
the correct direction. This difference was used as a
measure of relational knowledge.
The non-labelling condition was always carried out
first (if the labelling condition were carried out first, this
might influence the way that participants approached the
task in a later non-labelling condition). The two routes,
A and B, were counterbalanced so that half of the
participants walked route A in the non-labelling
condition and then route B in the labelling condition.
The other half walked route B (non-labelling condition)
and then route A (labelling condition). The two
conditions were administered on different days.
After retracing the route once (in each condition)
participants were asked to retrace the route a second time.
We did this to assess the effect of repeated experience on
route learning. Several participants declined to retrace the
route a further time. As participants had already walked
2 km (guided experience and first retracing) we did not
expect all participants to be willing to walk a further 1 km
to complete retrace 2.
Map task
Participants viewed a 2 m · 2 m room, marked out by a
cotton sheet on the floor of a laboratory. Four items were
placed in the marked-out room. These were two unique
items (blue desk, green chair) and two non-unique items
(identical red boxes). A coloured map (15 cm · 15 cm) of
the area was drawn to match the layout and included
symbols of the objects in the room (see Figure 1).
Participants were tested using a procedure based on
Blades and Cooke (1994). For each trial, a small toy was
hidden out of sight under one of the four objects by the
experimenter. While the experimenter was doing this,
the participant could not see the room or the hiding
places. After the toy had been hidden, the participant
was shown the map. A yellow sticker was placed on
the appropriate symbol on the map to indicate the
location of the toy, and the experimenter also pointed
to the correct symbol on the map. After seeing the map,
the participant was asked to go and find the toy in the
room.
There were two conditions: a non-rotated condition,
when the map was correctly orientated to the room; and
a rotated condition, when the map was rotated 180 in
(a)
(b) 
Figure 1 (a) Room layout for map task; (b) map used in map task.
458 Emily K. Farran et al.
 2009 The Authors. Journal compilation  2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
relation to the room, with 12 trials per condition. In each
condition the toy was hidden three times under each of
the four items in the room (i.e. six trials at unique hiding
places, six trials at identical hiding places). The trials
were presented randomly, except that in the first trial of
the experiment the toy was hidden under one of the
unique items. This was because young participants are
usually more accurate at using maps to find hidden
objects at unique places (Blades & Cooke, 1994) and we
wanted to maximize the chance of success in the first
trial.
Perspective-taking task
Two perspective-taking tasks were carried out. For both
tasks, participants sat at a table, opposite the
experimenter, and were presented with stimulus cards
(21 cm · 21 cm).
In the Level 1 perspective-taking task, based on Flavell
et al. (1981), participants were shown three stimulus
cards, which had one item drawn on each side
(apple ⁄orange, car ⁄boat, cat ⁄dog). Participants were
first asked to name the items on the card (e.g. ‘apple’
and ‘orange’). The card was then held vertically between
the experimenter and the participant, and the participant
was asked, for example, ‘do you see the apple or the
orange’, followed by ‘do I see the apple or the orange’.
The card was then reversed and the questions were asked
again, but the order in which the objects were named was
reversed. This was repeated for each stimulus card. The
order of the cards and the sides shown were
counterbalanced.
A Level 2 perspective-taking task was based on
Massangkay et al. (1974). Participants viewed three
single-sided stimulus cards, each depicting a picture that
had a distinct right-way-up (turtle, horse, table). After
checking that a participant could understand and
use the phrases ‘right-way-up’ and ‘upside-down’
appropriately, the participant was first shown a card
so that the picture on it was ‘right-way-up’ from the
participant’s point of view and they were asked if they
saw the object the right-way-up or upside-down (e.g.
‘do you see the turtle the right-way-up or upside-
down?’). The participant was then asked whether the
experimenter saw the picture the right-way-up or
upside-down (e.g. ‘do I see the turtle the right-way-up
or upside-down?’). The experimenter then rotated the
picture so that the object was now upside-down from
the participant’s perspective and then repeated the
questions. The order of presentation of pictures and the
positions of the pictures (right-way-up or upside-down)
were counterbalanced.
For both the Level 1 and the Level 2 perspective-
taking tasks, 12 questions were asked (6 participant
viewpoint, 6 experimenter viewpoint). Scores were
awarded for the experimenter viewpoint trials only,
because none of the participants had any difficulty
describing their own views of the stimuli.
Maze task
The maze task, based on Gathercole and Pickering
(2000), had two conditions, static and dynamic (see
Figure 2). Each maze consisted of a stick-man in the
centre, surrounded by two (level one) to six (level five)
‘walls’ around the figure, and each wall had two entrance
points. Entrance points in the walls were arranged so that
they were positioned either on opposite sides, or on
adjacent sides, alternately. Participants were asked to
remember a route from the outside of the maze to the
man in the centre. They were shown the correct route by
the experimenter and then asked to draw it from memory
on a blank maze. In the static condition the correct route
was shown as a red line drawn on a target maze, which
was removed after a 3-second exposure. For the dynamic
condition the researcher traced the correct route onto a
blank maze. There were four trials at each of the five
levels, and a participant progressed to the next level when
at least two out of four trials at a level were completed
correctly. Participants were scored for the total number
of trials correct (maximum score per condition: 20).
Results
Route-walking task
Route knowledge
Route knowledge was measured as the number of correct
choices (maximum: 20) that a participant made during
the first retracing of the route (see Figure 3). A two-way
ANOVA was conducted on participants’ route-
knowledge score for the first retrace of each route, with
a between-participant factor of group (WS, MLD, TD)
and a within-participant factor of condition (non-
labelling, labelling). This showed a main effect of group
(F(2, 57) = 35.72, p < .001, gp
2 = .56) as a result of
superior performance in the TD controls compared to
the MLD and WS groups (p < .05 for both), and higher
scores for the MLD group than for the WS group ( p =
.02). There was also a main effect of condition (F(1, 57) =
Figure 2 Maze-task stimulus examples: level 1, static
condition and level 3, dynamic condition.
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23.39, p < .001, gp
2 = .29) as a result of higher scores on
the labelling condition than on the non-labelling
condition. The interaction between condition and
group was not significant (F(1, 57) = 2.40, p = .10,
gp
2 = .08).
To further investigate the facilitation effect of labelling
the route, correlations between route knowledge and
verbal and non-verbal ability were explored. All three
participant groups completed the WASI vocabulary
subtest and the WASI matrices subtest, and so the raw
scores for these subtests were used as estimates of verbal
and non-verbal ability, respectively. Significant
correlations (two-tailed) were found only for the WS
group: route knowledge was significantly or marginally
positively associated with both verbal and non-verbal
ability (verbal ability, non-labelling: r = .49, p = .03;
labelling: r = .48, p = .03; non-verbal ability, non-
labelling: r = .43, p = .06; labelling: r = .64, p = .003). For
the TD and MLD groups there were no significant
correlations (p > .05 for all).
The extent to which route knowledge performance in
each condition was specifically related to non-verbal
skills and to verbal skills, respectively, was examined
using partial correlations. The variance that the WASI
matrices (raw scores) shared with the WASI vocabulary
(raw scores) was partialled out from the total variance
associated with the WASI vocabulary so that only the
variance in level of ability that was uniquely associated
with the WASI vocabulary remained. Similarly, the
variance that the WASI vocabulary shared with the
WASI matrices was partialled out from the total variance
of the WASI matrices, leaving only the variance uniquely
associated with the WASI matrices (i.e. non-verbal
ability). The patterns of results were not as expected,
because variance uniquely associated with non-verbal
ability was associated with performance for the WS
group in the labelling condition only, in which stronger
non-verbal ability was associated with a higher route-
knowledge score (r = .56, p = .01, two-tailed). There
were no other significant relationships (p > .05 for all,
two-tailed).
Learning was assessed by comparing performance on
the first and second retrace of each route. A number of
participants did not complete the second retrace of the
route owing to fatigue. Where this occurred, rather than
removing the participants who were matched to
the missing participant, matching was considered to be
at a group level (supported by independent t-tests). In the
non-labelling condition, the numbers of participants
who retraced the route twice were: WS, n = 13; MLD,
n = 9; TD, n = 17. Independent t-tests showed that
matching was adequate: WS and TD, CA, t(28) = 1.64,
p = .11; WS and MLD, CA, t(20) = 0.70, p = .49, non-
verbal ability, t(20) = )0.51, p = .61. In the labelling
condition, the numbers of participants who retraced the
route twice were: WS, n = 11; MLD, n = 11; TD, n =
9, and they were adequately matched at the group level
(WS and TD, CA: t(18) = 1.06, p = .30; WS and MLD,
CA: t(20) = 0.81, p = .43, non-verbal ability: t(20) =
)0.81, p = .43).
Learning was assessed for the labelling and the non-
labelling condition separately to optimize on remaining
power (see Figure 4). Two ANOVAs were carried out on
the number of correct turns (maximum: 20) with group
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Non-labelling Labelling
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f c
o
rr
ec
t 
tu
rn
s 
(m
ax
: 
20
)
Condition
WS
MLD
TD
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as a between-participant factor (WS, MLD, TD) and
learning as a within-participant factor (retrace 1, retrace
2). For both conditions, there was a main effect of group
(non-labelling: F(2, 36) = 26.66, p < .001, gp
2 = .60;
labelling: F(2, 28) = 3.74, p = .04, gp
2 = .21), which was
the result of higher scores in the TD group than in the
WS and MLD groups in both conditions (p < .05 for all).
In the non-labelling condition there were also higher
scores for the MLD group than for the WS group (non-
labelling: p = .05; labelling: F < 1). Significant learning
was shown from retrace 1 to retrace 2 (non-labelling: F(1,
36) = 51.74, p < .001, gp
2 = .59; labelling: F(1, 28) =
40.81, p < .001, gp
2 = .59). For the non-labelling
condition only, there was also a significant interaction
between learning and group (F(2, 36) = 5.64, p = .01,
gp
2 = .24). Individual group analysis showed that,
although learning occurred for all three groups in this
condition, learning was stronger in the MLD group than
in the TD and WS groups (WS: F(1, 12) = 6.07, p = .03,
gp
2 = .34; MLD: F(1, 8) = 52.36, p < .001, gp
2 = .87; TD:
F(1, 16) = 10.82, p = .01, gp
2 = .40). Although the
TD group showed significant learning, we noted that
TD performance was at ceiling by the second retrace
of each route (non-labelling: t(16) = )1.85, p = .08;
labelling: t(8) = )1.51, p = .17).
Relational knowledge
Relational knowledge was assessed by the pointing task,
and accuracy was measured as the difference (in degrees)
between a participant’s pointing to a landmark and the
actual direction of the landmark during the first retrace
of the route. Measurements were made to within one
degree. A second experimenter coded a random 25% of
the data for each group. Analysis of inter-rater reliability
by Cronbach’s alpha showed high reliability, r2 = 1.00,
p < .001. The pointing measure was an error score, and
therefore a lower score indicated better performance. The
maximum possible error was 180. One participant with
WS did not produce any pointing data, and so the WS
group had a maximum n of 19. For each walk of the
route, participants made 12 pointing estimates, and the
mean of these 12 estimates was calculated for each
participant.
The mean scores for the first retrace of the route were
compared to chance performance of 90 (guessing would
produce errors from 0 to 180, with a mean of 90). In
both the non-labelling and the labelling condition, all
three groups performed above chance (one-sample t-tests
against chance, p < .001 for all). The mean scores were
analysed by ANOVA, with a between-participant factor
of group (WS, MLD, TD) and a within-participant
factor of condition (non-labelling, labelling). There was a
main effect of group (F(1, 56) = 60.21, p < .001,
gp
2 = .68). This was a result of the substantially higher
accuracy for the TD controls, where the mean error was
36.41 (non-labelling) and 29.25 (labelling), than for the
other groups, where the mean error was consistently
above 65 (TD vs. MLD, WS: p < .05 for both; WS vs.
MLD: F < 1). The main effect of condition was not
significant (F < 1). The interaction between condition
and group was not significant (F(2, 56) = 2.57, p = .09,
gp
2 = .08) (see Figure 5).
The effect of learning on relational knowledge was
assessed by comparing pointing errors for the first and
second retracings of the route (see Figure 6). As noted
with reference to the route-knowledge analysis, not all
participants retraced the route a second time. There was
an additional loss of data from participants who walked
the route a second time but failed to provide pointing
data. Thus, these participants provided route-knowledge,
but not relational-knowledge, data for the second retrace
of the route. Participant numbers are therefore slightly
lower than for the route-knowledge analysis (non-
labelling condition: WS, n = 13; MLD, n = 7; TD,
n = 17; labelling condition: WS, n = 11; MLD, n = 9;
TD, n = 8), but still appropriately matched at a group
level (p > .05 for all group comparisons). The analysis
above indicated that performance was above chance for
the first retrace of the route. Mean scores for the second
retrace of the route showed that the WS and TD groups
performed above chance for both the non-labelling and
the labelling condition (one-sample t-tests against
chance, p < .05 for all), but the MLD group performed
only marginally above chance in the non-labelling
condition (p = .09) and at chance in the labelling
condition (p = .26). Given that performance on the first
retrace of the route indicated that all groups understood
the task, and that mean performance did not reduce in
this group from retrace 1 to retrace 2 (see Figure 6), this
effect appears to be accounted for by a loss of power on
account of reduced participant numbers. As such, the
MLD group were not excluded from subsequent
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analyses. Two ANOVAs were conducted, with a between-
participant factor of group (WS, MLD, TD) and a
within-participant factor of learning (retrace 1, retrace
2). For both conditions, analysis showed a main effect of
group (non-labelling, F(2, 34) = 27.08, p < .001, gp
2 =
.61; labelling, F(2, 25) = 20.57, p < .001, gp
2 = .62) as a
result of higher accuracy from the TD group than from
the WS and MLD groups (p < .05 for all), but similar
accuracy for the WS and MLD groups (p > .05 for
both conditions). There was no main effect of learning
in either condition (F < 1 for both). The interaction
between group and learning was significant for the non-
labelling condition only (non-labelling: F(2, 34) = 6.71,
p = .003, gp
2 = .28), which was because the TD group
showed significant learning (F(1, 16) = 10.07, p = .01,
gp
2 = .39), but the WS group showed a marginal effect in
the opposite direction (WS: F(1, 12) = 4.32, p = .06,
gp
2 = .27: retrace 1 < retrace 2), and the MLD group
showed no evidence of learning (F < 1).
Map task
In both the aligned and the rotated conditions of the
map task all three groups were at ceiling, as predicted,
when the toy was hidden in one of the unique hiding
places, and therefore we considered performance only
when the toy was hidden in one of the identical hiding
places.
There were six trials in the aligned condition and six
trials in the rotated condition when the toy was hidden in
an identical place. The mean scores are shown in
Figure 7. The TD group was at ceiling for the identical
hiding places in both conditions, and so analysis was
conducted between the WS and MLD groups.
Although there were always four hiding places in each
trial (two unique and two identical places), as
participants were always correct when the toy was
hidden at a unique place we adopted a conservative
measure of chance performance (50%) for trials at the
two identical hiding places. We therefore compared the
performance of the WS and MLD groups against chance
performance of three correct trials out of six. In the
aligned condition both groups were better than chance
(one-sample t-test against chance, WS, MLD: p < .001
for both). In the rotated condition the MLD group was
better than chance (p = .001), but the WS group
performed at chance (p = .27).
ANOVA was carried out with group (WS, MLD) as a
between-participant factor and condition (aligned,
rotated) as a within-participant factor. The main effect
of group was marginal (F(1, 38) = 3.47, p = .07, gp
2 = .08)
as a result of stronger performance in the MLD group
than in the WS group, although the chance performance
of the WS group might have attenuated the effect. The
main effect of condition was significant, because there
was better performance in the aligned condition than in
the rotated condition (F(1, 38) = 24.77, p < .001,
gp
2 = .40). The interaction between group and condition
was not significant (F(1, 38) = 1.07, p = .31, gp
2 = .03).
Perspective-taking task
For theLevel 1 perspective-taking taskperformancewasat
ceiling for all three groups, andwas therefore not analysed.
For the Level 2 perspective-taking task, participants
had to say whether a picture placed on the table between
them and the experimenter was the right-way-up or
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Figure 7 Map task: mean (s.e.) correct responses for identical
hiding places in aligned and rotated conditions.
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upside-down from the point of view of the experimenter.
Participants who guessed an answer would have been
correct on 50% of the six trials.
The Level 2 task produced ceiling effects for the TD
controls, better than chance performance in the MLD
group, and chance performance in the WS group (one-
sample t-test compared to chance, MLD: p = .03; WS:
p = .68) (see Figure 8). An independent t-test between
the performance of the WS and the MLD groups showed
that the MLD group had a marginally higher score (t(38)
= 2.00, p = .053).
Maze task
The mean scores for the maze task are shown in
Figure 9. All participants scored significantly above
floor performance (WS static and dynamic conditions:
p = .001 for both; TD and MLD static and dynamic
conditions: p < .001 for all). Importantly, this indicated
that, although the WS group had low scores, they did
understand the task.
An ANOVA was conducted to compare the
performance of the three groups in both conditions
(static, dynamic). This revealed a main effect of group
(F(2, 57) = 74.13, p < .001, gp
2 = .72) as a result of higher
TD than WS and MLD performance (p < .05 for both),
and higher MLD than WS performance (p = .01). The
effect of condition showed marginally higher
performance in the dynamic condition than in the
static condition (F(1, 57) = 3.59, p = .06, gp
2 = .06).
The interaction between condition and group was not
significant, F < 1.
Correlational analyses
To determine whether performance on small-scale and
large-scale tasks was related, correlations were carried
out between route knowledge and relational knowledge
on the route-walking task, and performance on the three
small-scale tasks: the maze task, the perspective-taking
task, and the map task. For the route-walking task, the
non-labelling condition, retrace 1, was used because this
condition provided the best reflection of how
participants would perform in an everyday route-
leaning context. For the maze task, the sum of correct
responses for the static and dynamic mazes was used. For
perspective taking, only the level 2 task was included
owing to ceiling performance on the level 1 task. For the
map task, the sum of correct responses for the identical
hiding places in the aligned and the rotated conditions
was included. The only significant correlations (two-
tailed) between the small-scale and large-scale tasks
related to the maze task. For the MLD group,
performance on the maze task correlated with large-
scale route knowledge only (r = .50, p = .03). For the
WS group, maze-task performance correlated with large-
scale route knowledge (r = .49, p = .03) and with
relational knowledge (r = ).49, p = .03) in the predicted
directions. None of the other comparisons were
significant (p > .05 for all).
Discussion
IndividualswithWSwere able to learn a route. Even at the
first retracing of the route (non-labelling condition) the
participants with WS recalled over half of the turns, and
with practice and verbal support (the second retrace in the
labelling condition) the participants with WS recalled, on
average, all but about 2 of the 20 turns. This finding
indicates that participants with WS have the potential to
learn a new route through anunfamiliar environment, and
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can do so after quite limited exposure to the route, even
though they may take longer than TD people to achieve
optimal performance. We discuss the differences between
the abilities of the three groups, but it should be borne in
mind that these differences are differences between
relatively good performances by all of the groups.
Despite good performance on the route-learning task,
the participants with WS and MLD did much less well
than the TD group on the measure of relational
knowledge. This measure indicated how well an
individual formed an understanding of the relative
position of different places in the environment. With
experience, in areas such as those used here, a TD adult
will usually have an accurate awareness of all the spatial
relationships between all of the places (Kitchin & Blades,
2001). Indeed, we found that the TD adults pointed
accurately towards unseen places, with errors, overall, of
only about 30, and we also found that the TD group
improved on the pointing measure with greater
experience of the route. In contrast, both the other
groups performed less well than the TD group, and had
errors of between 70 and 80. Although this was less
then chance performance of 90 for retrace 1, it is high
enough to demonstrate that the WS and MLD groups
had quite an inaccurate understanding of the
relationship between places in the environment. Indeed,
for retrace 2, with reduced participant numbers, for the
MLD group this level of error no longer differed from
chance. This high level of error is consistent with
evidence for poor spatial relation encoding on small-
scale tasks in WS (Farran & Jarrold, 2005; Nardini et al.,
2008). In contrast to the TD group, greater experience
did not lead to improved relational knowledge for either
the MLD or the WS group. Although the ability to learn
a route always precedes (developmentally and
temporally) the ability to encode spatial relationships in
the environment (Blades, 1991; Siegel & White, 1975), the
poor performance of the WS and MLD groups in the
pointing task and their failure to improve with more
experience suggests that the disjunction between learning
a route and learning environmental relationships may be
greater for WS and MLD participants than for TD
participants. This suggests that, although individuals
with WS are able to learn a novel route, they do this by
relying on learning a specific set of turns and landmarks.
The reliance on route knowledge in WS is an important
finding, as it suggests that, despite being able to learn a
route, individuals with WS would not be able to deviate
from that route to find a short cut or to make a detour.
This observation holds also for individuals with MLD.
The dissociation in WS between route knowledge and
relational knowledge could reflect a neural dissociation. In
TDadults there are two systems: place learning is a flexible
system, dependent on the hippocampus, which relies on
relational knowledge and the building of a cognitive map,
whereas the second, less flexible, system is an action-based
system that relies on route knowledge and activates the
caudate nucleus (Doeller, King & Burgess, 2008; Hartley
et al., 2003). Indeed, Hartley et al. (2003) report that
when TD adults were presented with an unfamiliar route,
good navigators activated their hippocampus and hence
their place-learning system, but poor navigators did not,
and relied on their action-based system. It is therefore
possible that the reliance on route knowledge inWS stems
from atypical hippocampal functioning, as observed by
Meyer-Lindenberg et al. (2004).
The above dissociation might also relate to the use of
different frames of reference. Nardini et al. (2008)
described a discrepancy in WS between the use of a
body frame of reference and that of an intrinsic frame of
reference. If individuals with WS use their relatively good
body frame of reference to encode the turns along the
route, then, coupled with correct landmark encoding,
this would suggest an ability to acquire route knowledge
in WS. In contrast, relational knowledge involves
encoding the spatial relationships between landmarks
from a number of perspectives. This involves an intrinsic
frame of reference, a relative weakness in WS, and thus is
consistent with the poor relational knowledge observed
in this study. However, we must be cautious in suggesting
that the variables measured in our study (large-scale
variables) relate directly to those considered by Nardini
et al. (2008) (small-scale variables), especially because we
were unable to show a direct relationship between small-
scale and large-scale performance.
An effect of labelling was found for route knowledge,
but not for relational knowledge. It therefore appears
that relational knowledge did not benefit from verbal
coding in typical or atypical populations. For both
measures, the pattern of performance of the WS group
was comparable to that of the control groups. If
individuals with WS spontaneously scaffold their poor
non-verbal abilities with verbal coding, then either no
effect or a reduced effect of labelling would have been
observed in this group. The results suggest that: first,
individuals with WS do not spontaneously use a verbal
strategy when learning the turns along a route; and
second, explicit instructions to encode visuo-spatial
information using verbal cues are beneficial in WS. The
level of benefit is akin to that of the typical population
and to that of MLD individuals. This has a third
implication, namely that the use of spatial terms did not
inhibit verbal facilitation in WS.
Route knowledge was not specifically related to verbal
or to non-verbal ability in any group; the performance of
the WS group was related to both verbal and non-verbal
ability, but no correlations were observed in the control
groups. This lack of correlation might be explained by a
strong memory component to the task. However, maze-
task performance, a measure of visuo-spatial working
memory (Gathercole & Pickering, 2000), only correlated
with route-learning ability in the learning-difficulty
groups. The contribution of memory could explain the
lack of correlation with verbal or non-verbal ability in
the MLD group, but not in the TD group. Some of the
TD participants scored close to ceiling for route
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knowledge, which might explain the lack of correlations
for this group.
Farran et al. (1999) observed that, in WS, non-verbal
tasks in which performance was relatively poor or
relatively strong were associated with the variance
uniquely related to non-verbal ability or to verbal
ability, respectively. This was investigated in the present
study with the prediction that route knowledge on the
non-labelling and labelling conditions would be
associated with variance uniquely associated with non-
verbal and verbal ability, respectively. This prediction
was not supported: the two control groups showed no
unique associations, and the associations in the WS
group were not as expected – route knowledge was
uniquely associated with non-verbal ability in the
labelling condition, but not in the non-labelling
condition as predicted. This finding suggests that
labelling enables individuals with WS to make better
use of their non-verbal skills; perhaps labelling
encourages these individuals to systematically visualize
each part of the route, leading to better recall.
Participants led the experimenter around the route
twice. Caution must be taken in interpreting analyses of
learning, because participant numbers were reduced. The
participants who did not complete the second retrace
may have been those who found the task more
challenging, tiring, or boring. If so, the remaining
members of each group are a less representative sample
of the population, because they were a self-selected
subset of the original sample. Nevertheless, the results
from the second retrace give an indication of the effects
of repetition in WS. Repetition of the route improved
route knowledge across all three groups. Thus, in
addition to verbal coding, individuals with WS
benefitted from repeated experience for the measure of
route knowledge. In the labelling condition, the extent of
learning on route knowledge in the WS group was similar
to that of the control groups. In the non-labelling
condition, the improvement in route knowledge in the
WS group was comparable to that of the TD controls,
whereas the MLD controls showed a relatively stronger
effect of learning. As the TD controls were at ceiling for
the second retrace of the route, it is possible that the
effect of learning was constrained. Comparison between
the MLD and WS group suggests that, without the aid of
verbal coding, individuals with MLD looked for
alternative strategies for learning the route, and that
this comes to fruition by their second retrace of the
route. In the labelling condition, this is less necessary, as
the strategy of verbal coding has already been suggested,
and so this strategy was used effectively across groups,
with comparable learning outcomes. The WS group,
however, did not appear to be seeking strategies in either
condition, and so show similar learning across
conditions, despite improved performance overall in the
labelling condition.
In contrast to route knowledge, relational knowledge
did not improve with repetition of the route, with the
exception of the TD group in the non-labelling condition
only. The absence of a learning effect might relate to the
lack of feedback; errors in route knowledge were
corrected to continue the route, but errors in relational
knowledge were not corrected. It is possible that, without
feedback, participants were less aware of their errors or
were less able to improve their performance on the
second retrace. It is likely that awareness of level of
performance was stronger in the TD group than in the
two learning-difficulty groups, owing to their higher IQ.
If this is the case, the differentiation between the labelling
and the non-labelling condition in the TD group might
relate to differences in the ability to recall the four
landmarks across conditions. Verbalizing the route might
have made the four to-be-remembered landmarks less
salient, owing to the numerous other potential
landmarks that were pointed out. If so, it might have
been easier for the TD group to show improved
performance in the non-labelling condition, as the only
landmarks that had been pointed out were the four
landmarks used to assess relational knowledge. In sum,
the pattern observed in the TD group could have been
related to two factors: increased critical awareness of
their own performance, and interference from additional
landmarks in the labelling condition.
The patterns of performance on the small-scale tasks
showed some similarities to large-scale abilities across
the participant groups. In both the level 2 perspective-
taking task and the identical-hiding-places conditions of
the map task, WS performance was marginally weaker
than that for the MLD controls. Both tasks include
relational knowledge: in the perspective task the
participant has to consider the spatial relationship
between the experimenter’s position and the picture on
the table; and in the map task the hiding place could be
identified only by relating the hiding place to some other
feature in the room. As the difference between WS and
MLD was only marginal for these tasks, one could argue
that this pattern is similar to the pattern of relational
knowledge in the large-scale task, in which WS
performance was at the level of the MLD group.
However, the WS group showed chance performance
with identical hiding places in the rotated version of the
map task and also had chance performance in the level 2
perspective-taking task, which could suggest a particular
weakness in WS for these small-scale tasks. If this is the
case, then the pattern of relational knowledge is different
between small-scale and large-scale environments. Note
that the measure of relational knowledge taken in the
large-scale task was relatively more sensitive as it was a
continuous variable, in contrast to the small-scale tasks,
in which participants gave one of two possible answers.
One could argue that, if a more sensitive measure of
relational knowledge were taken on a small-scale task,
then poor, but above-chance, performance might also be
observed. This would not, however, predict that group
comparisons would show patterns different from those
observed here.
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This last conclusion is supported by the lack of
correlations between the measures of small-scale and
large-scale relational knowledge in any of the participant
groups. Our results, therefore, do not support Allen
et al.’s (1996) claim that performance on small-scale
perspective-taking tasks is related to performance in
tasks involving large-scale relational knowledge.
Performance in maze tasks has been linked to
performance in large-scale route-knowledge tasks
(Allen et al., 1996). Performance on the maze task used
in our study did not correlate with route knowledge for
the TD group, but it did for the MLD and WS groups.
Thus, the only support for Allen et al.’s (1996)
suggestion that maze-task performance is related to
route knowledge was from the groups with learning
difficulties. For the WS group, performance on the maze
task also correlated with relational knowledge, which was
not predicted by Allen et al. (1996). Furthermore, the
WS group showed particularly poor performance on the
maze task, which contrasted to their route knowledge. As
such, these findings did not provide evidence for a
relationship between the small-scale maze-learning task
and large-scale route knowledge.
Overall, in our study, performance on the small-scale
tasks was not related to performance in the real-world
environment. This finding is in line with studies of TD
children (Quaiser-Pohl et al., 2002) and adults
(Hegarty & Waller, 2005) that have also failed to
find a relationship between small- and large-scale
spatial performance. We have shown that the
previous findings for TD children and adults also
apply to WS and MLD groups. This supports the
notion that small- and large-scale performances are
two distinct areas of spatial ability, supported by
independent mechanisms. Such mechanisms have not
yet been agreed upon. However, Quaiser-Pohl et al.
(2002) distinguish between ‘large-scale tasks in which
the observer is part of the environment and cannot see
the whole space of interest from one point of view, and
small-scale tasks… where the spatial relations of
objects can be seen at once’ (page 95) and where
‘…the movement of one’s body position is not
important’ (page 104).
The lack of a relationship between small- and large-
scale tasks for WS has an important implication for
research into visuo-spatial cognition in WS. To date, this
research is predominantly based on laboratory tasks,
and, although very valuable for extending our knowledge
about WS abilities, any extrapolations from such tasks to
real-world everyday contexts should be treated with
caution. Impairments in WS on small- and large-scale
tasks do not appear to indicate a common deficit, and
should be considered as independent deficits to two
distinct mechanisms.
We found that the participants with WS performed
at chance in the level 2 perspective-taking task, and in
the rotated version of the map task when the hiding
place was one of two identical targets. This
demonstrates that these tasks were too difficult for
the WS participants. Given that the WS group was
matched to the MLD group by Performance IQ, this
indicates specific weaknesses in the component factors
measured by these tasks, within the visuo-spatial
domain. Individuals with WS could complete the
non-rotated condition of the map task with identical
hiding places, which involved relational knowledge.
Successful completion in the rotated condition is
additionally dependent on the ability to rotate the
map mentally. Poor performance in this condition
seems to relate to poor mental rotation abilities. This is
consistent with previous findings that have reported
poor mental rotation in WS (Farran & Jarrold, 2004).
We also found that level 1 perspective taking was
successfully completed by the WS group, but that level
2 perspective taking was not. This task is dependent
on a participant’s ability to determine whether they or
the experimenter see an object as the right-way-up or
upside-down, and so also has a strong mental-rotation
component. Poor performance was also observed on
the maze task. This is best explained by impaired
visuo-spatial working memory in WS (Jarrold,
Baddeley & Hewes, 1998b; Vicari, Bellucci &
Carlisimo, 2003). Jarrold et al. (1998b) demonstrated
a Corsi span of between two and three spatial
locations in WS, and therefore our maze task, which
was visually more complex and involved remembering
at least two ‘entrances’, may have been at the limit of
working memory capacity for the WS participants.
The WS participants were successful in the map task
when the toy was hidden in one of the two unique hiding
places. This involved only matching (e.g. symbol of green
chair on the map to green chair in the room), rather than
spatial abilities. When the toy was hidden in one of the
two identical places, participants had to disambiguate
the correct red box. The WS participants could do this
if the map was aligned with the room. This indicates that
they appreciated that if the correct red box was, for
example, on the left of the map then it was on the left in
the room. However, when the map was rotated,
participants needed to consider the spatial relationships
within the layout (e.g. that the correct red box was
opposite the chair) and WS participants were unable to
do this. Therefore, the WS participants understood some
aspects of using a map (symbol-to-place correspondence,
and map-to-room directional correspondence, when
aligned). However, they were poor at identifying the
map-to-room spatial correspondences within the layout.
The latter skill is a key aspect of everyday map using
because maps include multiple identical symbols and
are not usually aligned with an environment. Users must
identify the correspondences between spatial patterns
on the map and those same spatial patterns in the
environment. Given our findings, we suggest that people
with WS will have difficulty recognizing such spatial
correspondences and that they would not benefit from
using maps when learning new environments.
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In summary, the results demonstrated that individuals
with WS can learn a route through a natural
environment, and that route knowledge could be
improved by verbal coding of the route, and by
walking it more than once. The extent of this
improvement was comparable to the improvement in
both CA-matched TD controls, and MLD controls
matched by CA and Performance IQ. This ability does
have some limitations, as the WS group did not show
an understanding of the relationship between
landmarks on the route. As this is a function of the
hippocampus in typical development (e.g. Hartley et al.,
2003), this is consistent with evidence for atypical
hippocampal function in WS (Meyer-Lindenberg et al.,
2004) and implies limited ability to deviate from a
learnt route. It is not possible to determine from our
study whether relational knowledge develops in WS as
an environment becomes more familiar. Despite these
difficulties with relational knowledge, the finding of
relatively good route knowledge in WS has important
practical implications because we demonstrated that,
given some verbal support and practice, people with
WS are capable of learning a complex real-world route.
They can learn such routes successfully, despite major
deficits in their performance in many small-scale
spatial tasks (e.g. map and maze tasks) that,
traditionally, have been linked to expertise in
wayfinding.
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